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HAWAII LONGLINE ASS 'N v.
NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE:
ARE REGULATORY AMBIGUITIES WITHIN
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
A SNAKE IN THE GRASS?
Dale Dixon*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Hawaii Longline Ass'n v. National Marine Fisheries Service,' the
Hawaii Longline Association (HLA), a fishery trade association,2 filed suit
seeking an injunction to prohibit the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) from excluding it from participating in formal consultations
pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and to prevent NMFS from
withholding a draft biological opinion.' The U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia held that the NMFS' interpretation of the regulation
it had authored, which defines HLA's applicant status, was a post-hoc
rationalization4 and therefore undeserving of substantial deference by the
court.- On the parties cross-motions for partial summary judgment, the
court granted in part and denied in part HLA's motion for partial summary
judgment and denied NMFS' motion for partial summary judgment.'
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2004.
1. No. 01-765 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 2002).
2. HLA "represents the owners, crews, suppliers, dealers, and vessels that make up the
Hawaii-based longline tuna and swordfish fishery ... ." Id. at *2.
3. A biological opinion, produced during the formal consultation process, sets forth the
expert agency's conclusions as to whether or not any endangered species will be jeopardized
or their habitat adversely modified by the actions of the acting agency. Greenpeace v.
National Marine Fisheries Serv., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1255-56 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
4. The court explained a post-hoc rationalization as a "litigation position that had never
been articulated by the agency itself prior to the litigation." Hawaii Longline Ass'n., No. 01-
765 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263, at *18.
5. Id. at *67.
6. Id. at *45.
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The principal issue was whether HLA should be considered an
applicant under the ESA, entitling HLA to participate in consultation
proceedings with NMFS. The NMFS, who was conducting a biological
assessment, contended that HLA was not entitled to participate in the
consultation process. By challenging NMFS' interpretation, HLA invited
the court to determine whether NMFS' interpretation of its own consulta-
tion regulation, found at 50 C.F.R. § 402 and issued jointly by NMFS and
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), was unreasonable.8 The
issue of regulatory interpretation required the court to examine a host of
deference standards in order to decide whether it should substitute its
judgment for that of the Agency's. Unfortunately, resolution of the
substantive issue in the case, which was whether the longline fishing
practices of HLA's members were contributing to the "decline in popula-
tions of four species of threatened or endangered sea turtles,9 was being
delayed by litigation over regulatory ambiguities. The question now
becomes, in situations dealing with species teetering on the edge of
extinction, does litigation over ESA regulatory ambiguities do injustice to
both the conservation interests and the economic interests involved? And
secondly, if it does, what can be done to improve how the ESA is promul-
gated, administered and enforced?
This Note considers whether changes should be made to the ESA that
would clarify ambiguities that are raised by this case and other vague
regulations promulgated by NMFS and USFWS that may present similar
interpretation problems in the future. This Note contends that it is
common, appropriate and often efficient for Congress to leave to agencies
the job of promulgating the detailed regulations used to implement a
statute, but that such an approach may not be desirable with respect to the
ESA. Regulatory ambiguities within the ESA can cause endless litigation,
uncertainty for all the parties involved as well as overburden federal
agencies who are working with finite resources. After reviewing the
development of the ESA, the significance of the ESA, and the judicial
review of administrative actions, this Note concludes that the regulatory
ambiguities presented by this case need to be clarified in order to avoid
diluting the effectiveness of such important preservation legislation as the
ESA.
7. Id. at *12.
8. Id. at* 14-'*15.
9. Id. at *5.
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I. EVOLUTION OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIEs Acr
The Endangered Species Act, enacted in 1973, is intended to protect
threatened and endangered plant and animal species from extinction.'0
Three major pieces of wildlife legislation preceded the ESA." These
preceding statutes were the Lacey Act of 1900, the Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 1966 and the Endangered Species Preservation Act of
1969. 12 The Lacey Act prohibited "the importation of animals taken in
violation of either state or foreign law." 3 Although the Lacey Act was not
designed to preserve endangered species, it was an important milestone in
conservation because it was the first use of federal power to protect wildlife
and biodiversity. " The Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1966 and
the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1969 were both specifically
designed to protect endangered species. The utility of these early acts,
however, was limited by Congress' attempt to reach a compromise between
economic interests and conservation interests.'5 The ESA of 1973 replaced
the acts of 1966 and 1969.
The ESA provides a structure for saving plant and animal species from
extinction that is more comprehensive than any other conservation
legislation ever enacted. 6 The Supreme Court, in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, viewed the ESA as holding environmental goals of
preservation above economic considerations. ' Passage of the ESA in 1973
was largely the result of shifting social paradigms that allowed for the
recognition of the value of healthy ecosystems and their value to humanity.
It was also during this period, the 1970's, that we saw the development of
numerous environmental lobby groups, the first 'Earth Day"18 and the
passage of congressional legislation designed to protect the quality of the
human environment and preserve the natural environment. Such legislation
includes the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and the National
Environmental Policy Act. 9
10. 16U.S.C.§1531 (2002).
11. Davina Kari Kaile, Note, Evolution of Wildlife Legislation in the United States:
Analysis of the Legal Efforts to Protect Endangered Species and the Prospects for the





16. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
17. Id.
18. Kaile, supra note 11, at 456-57.
19. Id. at 456.
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The ESA's stated purpose is "to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend
may be conserved," and "to provide a program for the conservation of such
endangered species and threatened species.. .. "I The key provisions of
the Act place certain requirements on the USFWS and the NMFS.
Section 4 of the Act requires the Secretary of the Interior and the
Secretary of Commerce to create and maintain a list of endangered and
threatened species.2 Section 7 prohibits federal actions that "jeopardize"
the continued existence of a listed species or result in the destruction of a
listed species critical habitat.22 Section 9 prohibits the "taking" of any
listed species by a private individual or any federal agency.' Of these
sections, Section 7 is by far the most influential. The courts have played
a significant role in making it such a powerful and far-reaching portion of
the ESA by adopting a literal interpretation of the Section 7 language.'
The ESA is a powerful piece of conservation legislation that affects a
vast range of economic and social enterprises. Like so many other federal
statutes, Congress has conferred broad rulemaking powers on USFWS and
NMFS and left them with the detailed implementation of the statute. This
places a heavy burden on these agencies to ensure that the goals and
standards of the ESA are satisfied.
Il. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE GIVEN TO AGENCY'S LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS
Agencies frequently interpret the meaning of statutes and the rules and
regulations that they have promulgated. Section 706 of the Administrative
20. 16 U.S.C.A. § 153 1(b) (2000). An endangered species "means any species which
is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range ... " 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(6) (2000). A threatened species "means any species which is likely to become an
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of
its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (2000).
21. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533 (2000). The determination of whether a species is endangered
should be made on "the best of the scientific and commercial data available." 16 U.S.C. §
1533(b)(1)(A) (2000). This is an important provision because it allows NMFS and USFWS
to act before a species becomes endangered, something the 1969 Act was criticized for
failing to do. Kaile, supra note 1I, at 45 l.
22. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1536(a)(1), (2) (2000). Section 7 is the most controversial section
of the Act, which is ironic because it received little attention during the Congressional
debates that established the Act. Kaile, supra note 11, at 455.
23. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(19). A "taking" is defined as harassing, harming, pursuing,
hunting, shooting, wounding, killing, trapping, capturing, or any attempt to do any of the
above. Id.
24. Kaile, supra note 11, at 456-57. See also Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. 153
(1978).
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Procedure Act (APA) calls for a court to set aside an agency's action if the
court determines that the action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law or without observance
of procedure required by law.' In cases challenging an agencies interpreta-
tion of a regulation, it seems that the APA provides little in the way of
deference and permits a reviewing court to substitute its own judgment for
the agency's legal interpretation. Contrary to the APA, judicial deference
analysis in most cases tends to turn on Supreme Court precedent, which
gives greater deference to agency action than does Section 706.
The general standard applied by courts when reviewing an agency's
interpretation of a statute under its administration is that of substantial
deference.2 As discussed by the Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, the standard of substantial deference applies
in instances where "Congress has not spoken to the precise question at
issue." The court must sustain the agency's interpretation so long as it is
"based on a permissible construction of the statute." This strong degree
of deference requires the court to defer to an agency's interpretations of law
in most instances and it reflects the Court's recognition of the fact that the
agency's expertise may give it an advantage in construing the law.
Nonetheless, the Chevron standard of substantial deference does not
address the situation that arises when an agency's interpretation of a rule
or regulation it has authored is being challenged. The Supreme Court
addressed this issue in Auer v. Robbins.2 In Auer, the Supreme Court held
that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to an even
stronger degree of deference than the Chevron standard provided and
should be considered controlling "unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation." In most cases dealing with an agency's interpreta-
25. 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2) (1996).
26. Hawaii Longline Ass'n., No. 01-765 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263, at *16 (citing
Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
27. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
28. Id.
29. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
30. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. at 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,359 (1989) and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
U.S. 410, 414 (1945). In Auer v. Robbins, St. Louis police sergeants and a lieutenant sued
the police commissioners for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
Auer, 519 U.S. at 455. The petitioners interpreted the regulation to mean that they were
entitled to overtime pay, however, both the District Court and the Eighth Circuit disagreed
with the petitioners interpretation. Id. at 456. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary
of Labor's interpretation of his own regulatory test is not "plainly erroneous," and this is
controlling. Id. at 461. "Auer deference is warranted only when the language of the
regulation is ambiguous." Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,588 (2000).
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tion of its own regulation, the deference analysis is comprised of a review
of Chevron and Auer. In our imperfect world, however, a second line of
cases has developed that focuses on the appropriate degree of judicial
deference when Chevron and Auer are inapplicable. In Christensen v.
Harris County,3 the Court held that "Chevron deference is only due where
an agency's statutory construction is announced through formal adjudica-
tion or rulemaking."32 The Court in Christensen was confronted with an
agency interpretation contained in an opinion letter and not a formal
adjudication." Under these circumstances, the Court held that such
interpretations are "entitled to respect" under the Court's decision in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,3' "but only to the extent that those interpretations
have the 'power to persuade."' 35 In United States v. Mead Corporation, the
Court affirmed the assertion that Skidmore can be applied when Chevron
is inapplicable.36
In short, the deference standard applied by the reviewing court depends
upon the sort of agency action that is being challenged. Circumstances may
arise where the standards of Chevron, Auer and Skidmore cannot be
applied. One particular situation where these highly deferential standards
are not applied is when the court finds that an agency's interpretation is a
post-hoc rationalization. A post-hoc rationalization is a litigating position
that is wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative
practice and which has not been asserted prior to the litigation. 7 In Bowen
v. Georgetown University Hospital, the Court stated that "deference to what
appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position
would be entirely inappropriate."'
31. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
32. Hawaii LonglineAss'n., No. 01-765,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263, at *21 (citing
Christensen, 529 U.S. 576 (2000)).
33. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
34. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
35. Christensen, v. Harris County, 529 U.S. at 587 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134 (1994)).
36. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (holding that a ruling letter by
the United States Customs Service is not entitled to Chevron deference, but under Skidmore,
it is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness).
37. Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204,212 (1988).
38. Id. at 213. See also Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628
(1971) (where the Court states "Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not
to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands.")
See also Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962) (the Court
stated that "[tihe courts may not accept appeliate counsel's post-hoc rationalizations for
agency actions ... ").
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The federal courts accept the notion that courts should defer to
administrative determinations because congressional legislation granted the,.
agency interpretative power, however, ambiguities allow for agency
discretion and in many instances the agency has more expertise on the issue
than does the court.39 Still, it is a complex issue due to the great variety of
actions performed by agencies.4' The process of judicial review is further
complicated by the Supreme Court's choice to tailor deference to the
specific variety of agency action being challenged.4' In Mead, the Court
stated that Congress has indicated that different statutes present different
reasons for considering respect for the exercise of administrative authority
or deference to it. 2 As a result of the variation in statutes and agency
action, the courts have to wade into a pool of deference standards and
exercise what they believe is the appropriate standard, perhaps causing
some inconsistency in the results of similarly situated cases.
IV. THE HAWAII LONGLINE DECISION
In Hawaii LonglineAss "n v. National Marine Fisheries Service,'3 HLA
sought an injunction to prohibit NMFS from excluding BLA from
participating in upcoming consultations and to prevent NMFS from
withholding a draft biological opinion. The consultations that HLA wished
to participate in were consultations required by the ESA whenever the
Fisheries Management Plan" for the Hawaii region 5 is revised. The
biological opinion,' which is at the heart of this case, was sought by HLA
so that it could review the opinion, as well as give comments and convey
the trade association's position to NMFS. NMFS was conducting the ESA
consultations because in May of 2000 it had "determined that longline
39. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 236.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 237.
42. Id. at 238.
43. No. 01-765, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263.
44. Fisheries under the United States' jurisdiction are regulated by the NMFS under the
Manguson-Stevens Act. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1883 (1994). The Magnuson-Stevens Act
established eight regional councils that are responsible for preparing fisheries management
plans. Hawaii Longline Ass'n., No. 01-765, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7263, at *4.
45. The fisheries based in Hawaii, Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Marianalslands fall
under the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(a)(1)(H)
(2000).
46. The biological opinion sets forth the agency's conclusions regarding jeopardy to
the subject species and adverse modification to the species critical habitat, as well as the
reasoning supporting the opinion. Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 55 F.
Supp. 2d 1248, 1256 (W.D. Wash., July 1999).
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fishing had likely exceeded the predicted take levels for Olive Ridley' sea
turtles as specified in the 1998 biological opinion."' Essentially, NMFS
was examining whether longline fishing49 in the Hawaii region was
contributing to the decline in Loggerhead, Leatherback, 5' Green, 52 and
Olive Ridley sea turtle populations. "It is undisputed that turtles of each
species are killed or injured when they become entangled in fishing lines
or pierced by hooks" set out by the longlining ships.53 The legal issue,
under Sections 7 and 9 of the ESA, was whether the longlining was
jeopardizing the turtles' existence over all or a portion of their ranges.5'
The court granted HLA's motion for partial summary judgment on
HLA's claims that it was an applicant for the purposes of consultation
under the ESA and that it was entitled to a copy of the draft biological
opinion.55 The court denied NMFS' motion for partial summary judg-
ment.
56
On the first issue, whether LLA was an applicant under the ESA, HLA
contended that it and its members qualify as applicants because its
47. The Olive Ridley sea turtle (Lepidochelys kempi) is listed as threatened in its Amer-
ican range in the Eastern Pacific. Marlo Pfister Cadeddu, Turtles in the Soup? An Analysis
of the GATT Challenge to the United States Endangered Species Act Section 609 Shrimp
Harvesting Nation Certification Program for the Conservation of Sea Turtles, 11 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL L REV. 179, 181 (1998).
48. Hawaii LonglineAss'n., No. 01-765, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263, at *7.
49. Pelagic longline fishing targets migratory species of fish, such as swordfish, tuna
and various species of shark. Longline vessels employ a mainline that can be up to sixty
miles long. Attached to the mainline are 400 to 2,000 branch lines (HLA) each with a hook
baited with squid. Hawaii LonglineAss'n., No. 01-765, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263, at *5.
Swordfish longline gear is usually set in the evening and hauled the next morning.
Longlining for swordfish occurs year-round, but activity is highest in the first and second
quarters. Honolulu Laboratory, Hawaii Swordfish Fisheries, available at httpi//wpacfin.
nmfs.hawaii.edu/hi/dar/hisword_text.htm.
50. The Loggerhead sea turtle (Caretta caretta) was listed as a threatened species on
July 28, 1978. It is listed as threatened throughout its range. It is found in the Atlantic,
Pacific, and Indian Oceans and it has major nesting concentrations in the southeastern
United States. Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 120 F. Supp. 2d
1005, 1015 (M. D. Fla., May 2000).
51. The Leatherback sea turtle (Demochelys coriacea) was listed as endangered
throughout its range on June 2, 1970. It is found circurmglobally and its principal nesting
grounds are on the Pacific coast of Mexico. Id. at 1016.
52. The Green sea turtle (Chelonia mydas) was placed on the endangered species list
on July 28, 1978. It is listed as endangered in Florida and as threatened elsewhere. Id.
53. Hawaii Longline Ass'n., No. 10-765 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263, at *5.
54. Id. at *5.
55. Id. at *45.
56. Id.
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members need NMFS approval to fish for tuna and swordfish." NMFS,
however, contended that neither HLA nor its members are an applicant
under the ESA definition because they do not directly conduct the
consulted-upon action, which NMFS argues is the approval of the Fisheries
Management Plan.58 Applicant, as defined by the regulation authored by
NMFS, "refers to any person . . . who requires formal approval or
authorization from a Federal agency as a prerequisite to conducting the
action."59
On the second issue, whether HLA had a right to a copy of the draft
biological opinion, HLA argued that "the regulations and previous agency
interpretations thereof make clear that applicants are entitled to a copy of
a draft" biological opinion.' In response, NMFS argued that the plain
language of the regulation demonstrated that there was no express
requirement that NMFS provide a copy of the draft biological opinion to
the applicant.61 HLA contends that NMFS violated "the ESA's implement-
ing regulations by shutting HLIA out of the consultation.. ." process and
the biological opinion process by not considering it an applicant.62 HLA
argues that NMFS' interpretation of the regulation is undeserving of the
high standard of deference as set forth in Chevron,' because the interpreta-
tion was not "asserted prior to the litigation and is therefore a post-hoc
rationalization."
The court began its analysis by deciding what standard of review to
apply to the circumstances presented by this case. Because the court found
NMFS interpretation of the regulation as to HLA's status as an applicant
a post-hoc rationalization, the court did not apply the highly deferential
standard found in Chevron.' The court stated that NMFS interpretation
was a post-hoc rationalization because "[alt no time prior to this litigation
has NMFS ever explicitly addressed the issue of HLA's status as an
applicant." 6 In fact, there was evidence, letters written by NMFS counsel,
57. Id. at *15.
58. Id.
59. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002).
60. Hawaii Longline Ass'n., No. 10-765, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263, at *30-31.
61. Id. at *30.
62. Id. at *12.
63. See supra text accompanying note 30.
64. Hawaii LonglineAss'n., No. 10-765,2002 LEXIS 7263, at *17-18 (citing Bowen
v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) for support of its position that NMFS
interpretation is a post-hoc rationalization).
65. Hawaii LonglineAss'n., No. 10-765, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263, at *16.
66. Id. at *18-19.
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from which it could be inferred that NMFS viewed HLA as an applicant.67
On this evidence, the court rejected the "plainly erroneous" standard of
Auer.6' After a review of the cases dealing with post-hoc rationalizations,
the court decided that it must replace Auer deference with the deference
standard of Skidmore. 9 Under Skidmore, the court said it would be more
than happy to accept NMFS' position if it is a sound and convincing
interpretation of its regulations. 7°
The court, however, found NMFS' argument unpersuasive based on the
agency's earlier interpretations of the regulations in an ESA Consultation
Handbook that the agency had published.7' In the preamble to the
regulations, it is explicitly stated that "applicant status is to be 'broadly'
conferred. '72 To further undermine NMFS interpretation of "applicant,"
the court discusses an example provided in the handbook that distinguishes
between an applicant and a party who simply has a general interest in an
agency's operations.7 From this handbook example, the court concludes
that HLA is an applicant because the fishermen have obtained licenses from
NMFS to fish under another provision, and the "licensees are required to
adhere to all regulations under..." the Fisheries Management Plan.7' The
court determined that "NMFS' attempt to limit applicant status to
consultations over a specific permit or license contradicts the unambiguous
and broad language of its own regulations."
67. Id. at *19.
68. Id. at *20.
69. ld at *21. See also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 89 L Ed. 124,
65 S. Ct. 161 (19"). Citing Skidmore in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576
(2000), the Court held that such interpretations are "entitled to respect" to the extent that
they have the "power to persuade." Hawaii Longline Ass'n., No. 10-765, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7263, at *21. The court went on to cite United States v. Mead Corporation, 553 U.S.
208 (2001), in support for its use of its position on the deference owed. In Mead, the
Supreme Court held that "the deference analysis was more complicated than a simple
examination of whether the agency's interpretation was subject to a formal rulemaking, as
Christensen had intimated." Id. at *21-22. The court also relied on Mead because it affirms
use of Skidmore deference as an alternative standard whenever Chevron does not apply.
"Christensen and Mead were issued as an alternative standard whenever Chevron does not
apply." Id. Under Skidmore, the court said it "would be more than happy to accept NMFS'
position if it is a sound and convincing interpretation of its regulations." id.
70. Hawaii Longline Ass'n., No. 10-765, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7263, at *22.
71. Id. at *22. The handbook discussed by the court was co-authored by United States
Fish & Wildlife Service.
72. Id. at *22-23 (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 19926 (June 3, 1986)).
73. Hawaii LonglineAss'n., No. 01-765, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263, at *22-23.
74. Id. at *23-24.
75. Id. at *24.
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The court further determined that the ESA Handbook reflects the proper
scope of the consulted-on "agency action."'76 NMFS defined the agency
action as "fishery management."' The court concluded that NMFS'
narrow articulation of the agency action directly contradicts the Hand-
book's declaration and that NMFS' language in prior biological opinions
demonstrates that the agency "ordinarily views its consultations as focusing
equally on both the management and operation of the fishery, rather than
only on the former.""8 The court completes its analysis of this issue by
stating "[t]he clear intent of the Section 7 regulations is to allow input from
those who are directly affected by ESA consultations." 9
On the second issue, whether NMFS is obligated to share a draft
biological opinion with an applicant, the court held that NMFS' interpreta-
tion of § 402.14 (g)(5) was "clearly inconsistent" with its earlier interpreta-
tions and therefore "cannot be accorded substantial deference."' Again,
referring back to the Handbook, the court found an earlier interpretation,
which confirms "the applicant is entitled to review draft biological opinions
obtained through the action agency, and to provide comments through the
action agency."'" The court stated that "[alithough the language in the
regulations is ambiguous," it appears from the language that release of the
draft [biological opinion] to applicants was intended to be automatic.8 2
IV. DISCUSSION
The decision in Hawaii Longline Ass'n is probably the correct legal
decision, but the case is not important for its disposition. The case is
76. Id. at *25.
77. Id. NMFS argued that under the Magnuson-Stevens Act it is responsible for
approving the Fisheries Management Plan. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1852(h)(1), 1854(c)(1)(A)
(2000).
78. Hawaii Longline Ass'n., No. 01-765, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263, at *26-27.
79. Id. at *27. The court further stated that the intent of Section 7 would be
undermined by denying a party such a voice based on a technical distinction over the scope
of the agency action.
80. Id. at *31, (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512, U.S. 504 (1994)
(quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415) (deferring to an agency's interpretation of its
regulations unless an "alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language
or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation
81. Hawaii LonglineAss'n., No. 10-765, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263, at *33.
82. Id. at *36. The court also stated that "the release of draft opinions to Federal
agencies and any applicants facilitates a more meaningful exchange of information. Review
of draft opinions may result in the development and submission of additional data, and the
preparation of more thorough biological opinions. Id.
20031
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important because it demonstrates that there are some problems associated
with the administration of the ESA. Some of the most basic definitions
within the ESA's regulations are ambiguous and in need of clarification so
that the Act is administered in an expeditious and uniform manner. The
appropriate entity, whether that is Congress, NMFS, USFWS, the Secretary
of Commerce or the Secretary of the Interior, should take the necessary
steps to clarify these rules and regulations. There are pragmatic reasons
why these ambiguities should be clarified by executive or legislative action
and not judicial action.
It is undisputed that the courts have played a significant role in shaping
the powers of the ESA and making it one of the most powerful pieces of
legislation in this country. This is evidenced by the Supreme Court's
position in Tennessee Valley Authority 3 where the Court enjoined the
filling of an already completed dam and stated that, "although one hundred
million dollars had been spent to complete the dam, Congress had
characterized the value of an endangered species as 'incalculable.""'
Notwithstanding the value of the courts and the work they have done to
make the ESA a potent statute, some of the imperfections of the ESA
cannot be remedied by the courts.
One argument against allowing the courts to provide definitions for the
ESA regulations is that the process simply takes too long. If the definitions
are provided by the usual course of the law, which is a case-by-case
approach, it could take a year or more to find out if a particular organiza-
tion is entitled to participate in ESA consultations. This is an unacceptable
time delay when considering, for example, whether shrimping trawlers are
jeopardizing endangered sea turtles in the Gulf of Mexico. 5 The time
delays resulting from litigation over issues dealing with semantics is
unfavorable to both the turtles' interests and the fishermen's interests.
Time may not be of the essence in the instant case, though it may be in the
next case where an endangered species is driven to extinction while waiting
for the Supreme Court of the United States to grant a writ of certiorari.
83. Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. at 153 (holding that it is clear from the
Endangered Species Act's legislative history that Congress intended to "reverse the trend
toward species extinction-whatever the cost). Id. at 184.
84. Id. at 187.
85. Matthew Brotmann, Comment, The Clash Between the WTO and the ESA:
Drowning a Turtle to Eat a Shrimp, 16 PAcE ENvTL L. REV. 321 (1999). This comment
provides a thorough discussion of the threats posed to sea turtles by the shrimp fishing
industry. It also discusses the new regulations mandating the use of new technology (turtle
excluder devices) to prevent the taking of endangered and threatened sea turtles by shrimp
trawlers.
Hawaii Longline Ass'n v. NMFS
A second argument for not leaving the definitions of ESA regulations
to the courts is that the courts operate using a host of deference standards.
This forces a court reviewing agency action to go through the Herculean
task of determining which deference standard to apply to the specific
action, as the district court did in the Hawaii Longline Ass'n decision.
Some suggest that the process may function better if the standard ofjudicial
review is simplified. For instance, Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion
in Mead, stated that the new deference standard established in Mead is
inconsistent with the old standard in Chevron. The effects of the new rule,
as Scalia sees them, are that it will result in "protracted confusion," 6
causing the courts to struggle in an effort to follow the theoretical deference
guidelines. The problem arises when a court tries to draw a line between,
for example, substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious and the hard
look doctrine. This tangled mass of word formulations is counterproduc-
tive with regard to the ESA because it contributes to the endless litigation,
uncertainty and unpredictability of the judicial process.
As the nation continues to grow and prosper economically, it is
foreseeable that more species will be pushed to the verge of extinction,
which will require swift and effective agency action to prevent their
extinction and ensure the preservation of biodiversity. Accordingly, it is
important that all reasonable efforts be taken to make enforcement of the
ESA work in a more efficient and productive manner. Therefore, now is
the appropriate time for executive or legislative action to clarify the
ambiguities in the ESA regulations in order to avoid superfluous and
expensive litigation from which no one benefits.
Finally, if humans continue to drive species to extinction at the current
rates, what we stand to loose is not inconsiderable. Influential Harvard
biologist, E.O. Wilson, has said that human destructiveness will cause
humanity to "suffer an incomparable loss in aesthetic value, practical
benefits from biological research, and worldwide biological stability." 7 As
a naive law student, my opinion is worth next to nothing. Yet if what E.O.
Wilson has to say is true, all efforts must be taken to ensure that the goals
of the ESA are met.
86. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 245-46.
87. E.O. WiLSON, BIOPHIIA 122 (1984).
20031
250 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:237
